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ABSTRACT 
The family ownership structure is widespread at present and substantial family 
corporations exist now all over the world, especially in Asia where a strong sense of 
family exists. However, whether the family ownership structure can improve 
company performance is still controversy. To find out how family ownership 
management structure affects corporations in China is the main objective of this 
thesis. This thesis investigates why family companies perform different further.  
 
The analysis in this paper is conducted by selecting sample from Shenzhen Small and 
Medium Enterprise Board from 2009 to 2013. Both accounting measures and market 
measure are used to examine the company performance. In the empirical part, the 
correlation between family ownership and company performance is demonstrated. 
Besides, relations between characteristics of family enterprises and company 
performance are illustrated.  
 
The results imply that family ownership structures have positive influences in 
company governances in China. Family companies perform better than nonfamily 
companies, which is similar to most prior studies. Further analysis indicates that 
correlations in family CEOs and family company performances are negative. And 
family companies, with the multiple large shareholder structure, have worse 
performance than without it. These two results are opposite to previous empirical 
studies. However, the ratio of family holdings has no effects on the family company 
performance. 
 
In short, family ownership structure is an efficient management structure in China. 
KEYWORDS: Family ownership, Firm performance, Family CEOs, Family 
holdings, Multiple large shareholder structure, SME board. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As an ancient enterprise organization form, family ownership structure becomes 
increasingly important for economic development. Correspondingly, family 
companies’ researches have become more popular than before. Modern mainstream of 
economics holds the negative attitudes that family enterprise is an inefficient company 
organization form. Obvious evidences can support that family companies have agency 
conflicts, which make family companies low efficient.  (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & 
Buchholtz 2001) 
 
However, based on widely received evidence and theory, families own control a large 
percentage of publicly listed corporations around the world (Cai, Luo & Wan 2012). La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) show that approximate 30 percent of 
companies are held by family while 36 percent of companies are widely controlled all 
over the world. Even in the continental Europe, Faccio and Lang (2002) find over 
two-fifths of companies are owned by family. The United States is considered as the 
highest ownership dispersion country, but according to the literature of Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), family companies account for approximately 30 percent of the S&P 500 
corporations. In Asian countries, family firms are the primary ownership structure and 
families or individuals controlled more than half Asian companies (Claessens, Djankov 
& Lang 2000). Considerable enterprises can be defined as family firms and thus these 
family companies are essential to the global economy. The rapid development of family 
firms makes it essential to check how the family ownership structure influence the 
company performance. 
 
1.1. Preview of Previous Studies 
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This thesis studies correlations between family controlling and company 
performances. As a different ownership structure, family ownership can affect the 
firm performance through different aspects. Several economists have studied this 
research area and a large number of literature has emerged. After reviewing articles 
between 1996 and 2010, De Massis, Sharma, Chua and Chriman (2012) find that 17.9 
percent of them study corporate governance, 10.7 percent of them study succession, 
7.9 percent of them study economic performance, 6.3 percent of them study resources 
and competitive advantage and 5.2 percent of them study entrepreneurship and 
innovation. Most of previous studies are about corporate governance in family 
corporations. In corporate governance, the main conflicts are the principal-agent 
problems and principal-principal problems. Family management can affect these 
conflicts and the influences can be either merit or demerit. Consequently, whether the 
family firms outperform or not is still debatable. 
 
Without certain external supervisions, founding-family ownership is considered to be 
less efficient and profitable ownership structure in some previous studies. This opinion 
is mainly from derived from principal-principal conflicts.  
 
First, family company owners are easy to forgo the rule of maximizing profits and then 
pursues private benefits instead of firm performance. Besides the family wealth, private 
benefits also include family reputation, family harmony and so on. If the family 
managers are non-rational, their irrational behavior can even bring losses to the family 
firms. Combining ownership and management allows minority large company owners 
to benefit themselves at the expense of firm benefits (Fama & Jensen 1983). The 
alignment of decision management and control give large minority shareholders 
residual claims. They would like to satisfy their own needs instead of reinvesting for 
their company. Demsetz (1983) notes that founding-family owners (one kind of 
owner-managers) may prefer non-pecuniary consumption rather than profitable 
projects. Favoring on-the-job consumption can make founding-family owners aim at 
wrong firm targets. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) argue that the requirements of 
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special dividends for family would lead to poor operation and firm performance. They 
study the Times Mirror Company, which belongs to Fortune 500 firm. The Chandler 
family control this company for more 100 years and hired the CEO from other 
industry in 1995, who leads to poor stock price performance and firm operating. 
 
Second, as the concentrated large shareholders, family company owners take actions to 
create impediments to prevent third parties from capturing the firm control. These 
actions can keep the control power of family and increase the number of family 
executives. Barclay and Holderness (1989) observe that large concentrated company 
owners establish a greater managerial entrenchment, which may reduce the firm value． 
 
Third, family company owners often select managers and other management positions 
from family members and this is hard to obtain qualified and capable top managers 
from such a limited labor pool. Family managers are mainly chosen because of family 
tie instead of outstanding manage competence (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino & Buchholtz 
2001). Overall, such family company managers will take actions to maximize their 
private family interest, leading to poor firm performance. 
 
Although previous studies indicates that family ownership and management could 
bring competitive disadvantages, Lee (2006) supports founding family members’ 
managements can improve firm performance. The most famous literature about family 
business is Anderson and Reed (2003:1301-1328)’ paper. They use S&P 500 
companies as their sample and conclude that family corporations can perform at least 
the same as nonfamily firms. Various researchers find different reasons to support this 
opinion. 
 
First, family company owners have extraordinary positions because of historical 
presence and large undiversified equity position. These extraordinary positions bring 
the increase of firm value. As the large shareholders, family owners like to take actions 
to mitigate managerial expropriation and the interest alignment of managers and 
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owners can also reduce principal-agent conflicts (Demsetz & Lehn 1985). Accordingly, 
the decrease of agency cost can improve company performance. 
 
Second, the long-term presence of family company owners can give them longer 
horizons than non-family firms (James (1999)) and rise their reputations. The longer 
investment horizons can make firms away from managerial myopia and give up 
investment objectives which can only boost current earnings (Stein 1988, 1989). 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) show that increasing reputations deriving from 
long-term presence can confirm companies to borrow money at a low interest. This 
family reputations can also cement business relationship with other cooperative 
enterprises.  
 
Third, contrary to prior literature, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) suggest that a 
family manager can provide the family company with extraordinary techniques and 
contributions, which can be unexpected advantage. In family firms, it is easier to 
supervise and monitor family CEOs than non-family corporations. Block (2010) 
observes that family owners prefer to avoid laying off employees to get their reputation 
for social responsibility. Cai, Luo and Wan (2012) select 351 listed family firms in 
China from 2004 to 2007 as theirs sample and support that family CEOs can benefit 
company performances measured by market and accounting measures in China. This 
degree of the positive effect is related to the degree of family ownership. As a result, 
selecting CEO from family members can be also advantageous.  
 
1.2. Motivations of the Thesis 
 
The most important motivation of this study is to make it clear that how the family 
firms perform in China. The modern ownership structure is predicted to be dispersed 
and the corporation should be controlled by different kinds of shareholders (Berle & 
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Means 1932). On the contrary, as a concentered ownership structure, the family 
ownership is widespread and substantial family corporations exist all over the world, 
especially in Asia where a strong sense of family exists. In Yoshikawa and Resheed 
(2010: 274 - 295)’s sample, 76 percent companies selected from Japan have family 
owners. By analyzing the Asian family firms’ success and succession, Dieleman, 
Shim and Ibranhim (2013) find that there are 60.8 percent companies are controlled 
by family on the Singapore Exchange (SGX). As a major country in Asia, China is no 
exception.  
 
In 1949, the People’s Republic of China was established. But China used centrally 
planned economy from 1949 to 1978. In 1978, China adopted the policy of 
reformation and opening which only focused on rural areas at the beginning. In 1992, 
the socialistic market economy system was adopted, which provided the 
establishments of Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. Since then, family 
businesses appeared and started to accelerate the Chinese economic development. 
According to nominal gross domestic product (GDP), China stands the second largest 
country nowadays and it has the largest purchasing power in the whole world.  
 
In 2001, the first batch of family enterprises such as TDG holding company started to 
be listed. Although family business is relatively new in China, its rapid growth bring it 
an opportunity to play a vital role in Chinese economy. For now, China is similar to 
most of emerging economies and family corporations are common in Chinese listed 
enterprises. Researches of family business started in the beginning of this century in 
China. Because of the late start, the research results are also relatively scare and most 
of the results are subjective judgments of family enterprise system. Clearly more work 
is needed in China to figure out the correlation between family ownership and 
company performance, which can make family corporations more competitive in 
Chinese economics. 
 
Another motivation of this thesis is to use the Small and Medium Enterprise Board 
14 
 
listed companies as the sample to obtain more exact correlations in family ownership 
and performances of companies with small or medium size. The Small and Medium 
Enterprise Board (hereinafter referred to as the SME Board) was established by 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2004. Corporations listed on SME Board are small and 
medium and their share capital cannot reach to RMB 100 billion. But the total share 
capital of SME Board listed companies shall not be less than RMB 30 million before 
the offer. After offering, the total share capital of SME Board listed companies should 
be more than RMB 50 million. This means that these companies are not particular 
small, which can bring us reliable data.  
 
As mentioned before, an increasing number of researches about family corporations 
emerge derived from the increasing proportion of family enterprises. De Massis, 
Sharma, Chua and Chrisman (2012) observe that the studied topics about family 
businesses are mainly about corporate governance, succession, economic performance 
and resources and competitive. Most of these researches collect data from developed 
countries and the main samples are large corporations. Even though most of these 
samples are large firms obtained from developed countries, researchers still get 
different results about family firms’ performance. The fact that family ownership can 
affect company performance is universally accepted by these researchers. 
 
Family ownership can bring family companies more advantages because of its 
combination of owner and manager. Anderson and Reeb (2003) show that family 
ownership structure could gain better enterprise performance through analyzing the 
firms from S&P 500. After collecting big companies from developed counties and 
analyzing them from several various dimensions, family companies are suggested to 
perform better than nonfamily companies (Jensen & Meckling 1976, Daily & 
Dollinger 1992, Beehr, Drexler & Faulkner 1997, Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel & 
Gutierrez 2001, McConaughy, Matthews & Fialko 2001). From other management 
perspectives, the correlations between family ownership structures and company 
performances are considered as negative. That is to say, family ownership makes 
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management less efficient. For example, family companies tend to have more 
managerial entrenchments in Spanish firms (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel & 
Gutierrez 2001). Perrow, Reiss and Wilensky (1986), Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and 
Buchholtz (2001), Cucculelli and Micucci (2008) use developed countries’ big 
companies as their samples and conclude the similar opinion that family ownership 
structure can give negative effects to enterprise performance.  
 
There are also some studies about family firms in China, but they select data from 
main boards of the Shenzhen and Shanghai Chinese Stock Exchanges. By using all 
family corporations which listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Chinese Stock 
Exchanges, Cai, Luo and Wan (2012) suggest that family CEO make family 
corporations gain a better company performance than family corporations with 
outside CEO. It would be interesting if we can support that family companies perform 
worse in small and medium enterprises board. Therefore, getting results about family 
firms’ performance in small and medium enterprises would be meaningful. 
 
The final motivation is to see if the culture can affect family firms’ performance 
differently. Most of the studies mentioned before are designed among large family 
firms in western developed countries. Choosing China as the population can contain 
the cultural differences of east and west. Cultural differences make the management 
system, agency cost and supervision mechanism different. Correspondingly, family 
firms’ performances are different. Most of previously studies are western developed 
countries’ studies and they get two opposite concludes. Through this paper, we can 
analyze whether family firms can outperform nonfamily firms in eastern developing 
counties. If we can get the same result as other researches from China, we can do 
more studies about the relationship between eastern culture and family business. 
 
1.3. Hypotheses and Structure of the Thesis  
16 
 
 
This paper studies correlations between family ownership and company performance in 
China. From large numbers of studies and their results mentioned above, the main 
hypothesis can easily derived. The main hypothesis of this paper (H) is that family firm 
has positive influences on company performance. To examine this main hypothesis, the 
sample is all SME Board listed companies. By finding corresponding evidences, the 
previous purposes can be achieved.   
 
The studies explained before have distinct differences in their results. Most of these 
studies just simply describe the correlation between family ownership and corporation 
performance. But there are no reasons which can interpret the relationship involved in 
these studies. Research in recent years tends to pay more attention on finding the 
reasons why family firms perform differently. They often use family CEO and the 
percentage of family board members as independent variables to explain why family 
ownership can make companies have different performance. Based on these, this study 
includes another three hypothesizes to discuss how to improve the family companies’ 
management.  
 
1.3.1. Family CEOs and Company Performance 
 
In whatever company, CEO is the most important and the most powerful role and he 
is responsible for whole enterprise’s performance. Hence, the core element for family 
company management is the family CEO. Family corporations are the combination of 
family and corporation. Besides benefit maximization, the family corporations also 
aim to maximize the family profit. In this situation, family CEO can help the family to 
grasp their own benefits. But previous studies have shown that family CEOs can give 
enterprise performance their advantages and disadvantages.  
 
17 
 
Based on the above analysis, this paper builds hypothesis 1 that family CEOs benefit 
firm performance in China. 
 
1.3.2. Family Shareholders and Company Performance 
 
The first kind agency cost is the conflict between firm owner and the manager. 
Through testing the hypothesis 1, whether family ownership can reduce this agency 
cost can be checked. However, companies always one or more large shareholders. 
Hence, in family enterprises, the families can be categorized as large shareholders. 
Large shareholders (family shareholders)’ power can be quantified by the level of 
family stake. Because large shareholders have power to control the firm by voting or 
influencing firm decisions, they undoubtedly choose the manager or decision that can 
benefit them. This behavior will rise the second kind of agency cost which is between 
large shareholders and minority shareholders.  
 
To observe if family large shareholders can affect family firms’ performance, this 
paper builds hypothesis 2 that increases in percentages of family ownership have 
positive influences on company performances. 
 
1.3.3. Multiple Large Shareholder Structure and Company Performance 
 
Through observing the Tobin’s Q under different equity ownership structures, 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) state that the corporate value can be affected by the 
structure of equity ownership structure. In family enterprises, there are not only large 
family shareholders, but also large outside block holders. Most of the large outside 
shareholders can hold over 10 percent shares of enterprises by themselves. As large 
shareholders, outside block holders can also have voting right and influencing power 
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to affect the family companies. They also want to maximize their private profit 
instead of company benefit. In nonfamily firms, the large outside block holders 
usually bring the second kind of agency cost. The private benefit for large outside 
block holders can harm both company performance and minority shareholders. 
However, in family corporations, the existence of large outside block holders can be 
favorable.  
 
In consideration of self-interest, large outside block holders can be strong incentive to 
get the family business information and supervise the family shareholders’ decisions. 
Consequently, large outside block holders can effectively check and balance the 
power of large family shareholders.  
 
Based on previous analysis, this paper rises hypothesis 3 that the existence of multiple 
large shareholder structure can improve company performance. 
 
The remainder of this thesis contains five parts and they are arranged as following: 
Chapter two is the theoretical part. It describes the definition and types of family 
corporations and discusses the agency problems existing in family companies. 
Chapter two also focus on the measures of company performance and corporate 
governances in family enterprises. Chapter three explains three main empirical studies 
which have similar hypothesizes with this paper and provides the basis for model 
establishment. Chapter four explains the data collection and the main methodology. 
Chapter five describes both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. The last 
chapter summarizes the conclusions and the limitations of this thesis. 
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2. THEORY OF FAMILY FIRM 
2.1. How to Define the Family Company? 
 
The definition of family companies still is a big problem which rises scholars’ 
disputation. Because of different research perspectives and different research paths, 
differences in the definition of the family firm are increasingly larger. Although every 
researchers give one definition of family company when they study the family 
business, still no definition can be agreed by all the researchers.  
 
Using the numbers or the proportions of family directors can define family firms. And 
the fractional holdings of them can also be used. Fractional holdings (fractional equity 
ownership) are proportions shares of a costly asset and the shares’ owners usually are 
individuals. If the asset is a company, the fractional equity ownership allows plentiful 
investors to own the shares of the company. And the fractional equity ownership will 
also give these investors certain rights to influence the company management. Hence, 
the fractional holdings of founding family members allow them participate in firm 
management. The differences in founding family ownership levels may not affect the 
founding family members’ rights to control the firm. Because only officers and 
directors and owners who hold more 5 percentage shares are require to report their 
holdings by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If the founding family members 
who are not officers or directors hold 4.9 percentage shares of the firm, it cannot be 
captured as part of family ownership. Consequently, the dummy variable can be used 
to define family enterprises. When founding family members hold fractional equities 
or family members work as directors, the dummy variable should to be one which 
denotes that this company is a family company. (Anderson & Reed 2003:1308-1310) 
 
Not only the corporations that established by one or more individuals or a family 
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should be defined as the family companies. Buts also the corporations that held by an 
investor for a long time should be defined as the family firms. A company can be 
controlled by an investor for several decades and the investor may hold more than ten 
or even more percent of shares. Because the investor hold most of the control rights of 
the company for a long period of time, he can shape the company as he wants in 
innumerable ways. Although this company is not built by the founding family, it can 
be called family firm. When defining the family firms, the criterion is gradually 
changed from founding family to a family or an individual. (Isakov & Weisskopf 
2014:5) 
 
A widely held company can be defined if there is no shareholders who hold more than 
20 percent of voting rights. When a private stockholder holds over 20 percent of 
company shares, he can have a sufficient influence on company decisions and 
management. It is essential to distinguish the family shareholders and private 
shareholders. Some private investors may hold most of the control rights of the 
company, however, they just buy the shares for quick profits and leave soon after 
getting these profits. Since these private investors neither affect company decisions 
and management nor establish company regulations, this kind of corporations cannot 
be categorized as family firms. In practice, it is difficult to pick out such private 
investors. Correspondingly, when a family or a stockholder holds over 20 percent of 
shares (control or voting rights), this company can be defined as family firm. (Isakov 
& Weisskopf 2014:5-6) 
 
Except direct holding stock ownership, families can also control a company through a 
pyramid ownership structure. The pyramid ownership structure exists when the 
company ownership structure is the top to down chain of control. At the top of such 
ownership pyramid, it should be the ultimate owners and they control the company 
through successive layers. For example, a family can control Property Management 
Company or Investment Group Company and then Property Management Company 
or Investment Group Company can hold certain percent shares of other company. If a 
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stockholder or family owners ultimately hold over 20 percent of corporation control 
or voting rights, this company can be identified as family firm. (Cai, Luo & Wan 
2012:932) 
 
Figure 1 shows how an individual control a family company through the pyramid 
ownership structure. Mr. Wang owns 98 percent of Dalian Hexing, which owns 99.76 
percent of Dalian Wanda Group, which owns 51.07 percent of Dalian Wanda 
Commercial Properties. Thus the ultimate ownership of Mr. Wang in Dalian Wanda 
Commercial Properties is 49.9 percent, the product of (98%, 99.76%, and 51.07%). 
His ultimate control in Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties is 51.07 percent, the min 
of (98%, 99.76%, and 51.07%). The control divergence equals the ratio of 51.07% to 
49.9%. 
 
   
  
                             98% 
  
 
                             99.76% 
 
 
                             51.07% 
 
 
Figure 1. A real firm sample of pyramidal ownership structure 
 
Although researchers tend to use the fractional holdings of family members as the 
criterion to identify a family company. The levels of lower bound of family holdings 
are varied among them. As mentioned before, whether an ultimate family or 
Mr. Jianlin Wang  
Dalian Hexing CO., LTD 
Dalian Wanda Group CO., LTD 
 
Dalian Wanda Commercial Properties CO., LTD 
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stockholder holds over one-fifth of corporation control rights can category the family 
companies and nonfamily companies. Feng (2011), Ding, Qu and Zhuang (2011) and 
Luo, Wan, Cai and Liu (2013) classify family company where the ultimate family or 
stockholders hold more than one-tenth of control rights. After tracing the pyramidal 
ownership structure, they can recognize the ultimate owners.  
 
In a conclusion, when the corporations have an ultimate individual, family or more 
individuals own a certain amount of company control rights, they can be considered 
as family companies in most cases. 
 
2.2. Types of Family Companies 
 
Because family and enterprise are two different systems and they focus on different 
goals. The combination of family and enterprise has both different targets and 
overlapping parts. 
 
Distinguishing family companies by the professionalization construct is super simple 
and it always brings one-dimensional manner. To reveal family firms’ 
multidimensional features, a cluster analysis can be introduced. The exact definition 
of cluster is hard to be got. It is different from classification analysis which already 
has the whole types before analysis.  
 
Here, after analyzing, the cluster analysis includes five different dimensions: “1. 
control systems of finance, 2. activeness in top level, 3. authority decentralization, 4. 
control systems of human resource, and 5. governance systems of nonfamily 
involvement”. Correspondingly, family firms can be categorized into four types: 
“autocracy, domestic configuration, clench hybrid, and administrative 
hybrid.”(Dekker, Lybaert, Steijvers, Depaire & Mercken 2013:87-88) 
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Autocracy: this cluster has low levels on all dimensions of professionalization. This 
characteristic shows that most family firms in this cluster are owner-managed family 
companies. (Dekker, Lybaert, Steijvers, Depaire & Mercken 2013:90) In this kind 
company, the authority is highly concentrated and the owner tries to control all the 
businesses of the company (Lubatkin, Schulze, Ling & Dino 2005). To achieve 
families’ goals of controlling the family companies, involvements of family 
stockholders should increase and attendances of outside stockholders should decrease.  
 
Domestic Configuration: in this kind of family firms, most of company management 
is still controlled by the family. Outside nonfamily members can both exist in the 
board of family company and participate in family company management, but the 
amount for them is limited. Although the authority in these kind of family firms is still 
highly concentrated. Family owners start include the control system into professional 
company management. Both human resource control system and financial control 
system can be found in the Domestic Configuration. (Dekker, Lybaert, Steijvers, 
Depaire & Mercken 2012:91) 
 
Administrative Hybrid: this cluster has high levels on all dimensions of 
professionalization. Zhang and Ma (2009) indicate that the family owners create a 
management hybrid by adding outside nonfamily managers who are professional and 
experienced. Consequently, the family members’ involvement of company 
management decreases and the authority is dispersed. The increasing involvement of 
outside managers bring more control systems into the family firms, which can advise 
and supervise the companies’ decisions better. The family members should participate 
in the company management in more objective and formal ways. (Dekker, Lybaert, 
Steijvers, Depaire & Mercken 2012:91) 
 
Clench Hybrid: in this cluster, family firms are more professional than these in 
administrative hybrid. The degree of family involvement in company keeps on 
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decreasing to make more room for nonfamily members and this family firm is 
combination of family and nonfamily members. In this type, family members and 
nonfamily members “clench” together in order to coexist in the family firm. However, 
the human resource control system and financial control system are rarely found 
because of maladaptation. Informal controls (such as mutual trust and shared values 
and so on) that used in Autocracy type are usually adopted by the family and 
nonfamily members. (Dekker, Lybaert, Steijvers, Depaire & Mercken 2012:91) 
 
In these four family company types, goal conflicts between family and company can 
harm both family members’ relationships and company development, which would 
bring costs for the family corporation. And the balance between family and company 
can offer both family relationship stability and the sustainable development of family 
business, which would bring benefits for the family firm. Whether families will bring 
costs or benefits to family firms mainly depend the agency problems.  
 
2.3. Agency Problems in Family Companies 
 
Traditional agency problems are generated from separating the ownership and 
management, but these separations are essential in large public companies. However, 
this separation creates obstacles for owners to supervise the behavior of managers. 
Such separation can also be dangerous. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009:12-15) 
 
2.3.1. Reasons for Agency Problems 
 
Corporations’ sizes are becoming large and the demands for professional management 
are becoming higher because of the appearance and growth of the modernized market 
economy. Thus the owners who also act as the managers need to put more effort on 
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their companies. In addition to attracting new investors to join this enterprise, it also 
takes a long time for initial investors to design the enterprise developing strategy. At 
this time, they would prefer to hire outside managers to manage the company to get 
them away from the tedious daily company operation. The social division of labour 
can make the company management more efficient. Under a good supervision 
mechanism, both owner and operator can benefit. But the division of labor will 
inevitably bring some negative effects which lead the appearance of the traditional 
agency problems. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 12-15; Jensen & Meckling 1976: 
4-7; Fama & Jensen 1983: 5-6) 
 
After separating the ownership and managerial authority, traditional agency conflicts 
appear. Owners or shareholders hope managers manage the enterprise according to the 
goal of obtaining the maximization of stakeholders’ interests. But because 
administrators are not stakeholders and sometimes they hold parts of stocks, manager 
often deals daily with enterprise’s decisions to benefit himself. Such as getting the 
extra income through on-the-job consumption which can result in the damage of 
owners’ interests.  
 
One important reason for traditional agency conflicts is serious information 
asymmetries in owners and manager. Manager is on the front line, engaging in 
business activities. They control the inflows and outflows of company currency 
capital and the internal resource allocation within a certain scope of authorization. 
Managers are in a relative dominant position of information, while owners are in 
disadvantage in information. It is entirely possible for managers to use information 
superiority to reap additional benefits for themselves. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 
12-15; Jensen & Meckling 1976: 4-7; Fama & Jensen 1983: 5-6) 
 
Another internal reason for traditional agency problems is that managers do not hold 
company shares and this reason will bring two results. First, manager is hardworking 
and obtains excellent company incomes. However, stockholders grab most of these 
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benefits and manager can only receive the promised payment. This imbalance of 
giving and taking can make managers to abandon positive effort which is necessary 
for the successful company. Besides, a utility derived from on-the-job consumption is 
fully enjoyed by managers, but the high cost of on-the-job consumption is fully paid 
by company shareholders. This imbalance of giving and taking can easily lead 
managers to seek own welfare at the cost of corporate interests. (Brealey, Myers & 
Allen 2009: 12-15; Jensen & Meckling 1976: 4-7; Fama & Jensen 1983: 5-6) 
 
In order to solve agency problems, owners need to monitor managers. Using 
supervision and incentive mechanism to make sure that managers seek for what 
owners want. The cost of ensuring managers make optimal decisions is agency costs. 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976: 5) 
 
2.3.2. Types of Agency Problems in Family Companies 
 
Reasons for agency problems are mainly discussed through correlations in managers 
and owners. We can also use the similar reasons to explain conflicts in majority 
stakeholders and minority stakeholders. In this kind conflicts, majority shareholders 
can control the company’s operation throng a large number of holdings. They would 
force managers to seek their own interests. In this situation, majority shareholders act 
as managers and minority shareholders act as owners. 
 
Two different kinds of agency costs existing in family companies: principal-agent 
agency problem and principal-principal agency problem. These two kinds of agency 
problems cause the different performances between family firms and nonfamily firms. 
 
Principal-agent conflicts: separating ownership and management can bring the 
traditional agency problems, which leads managers seek their own interests instead of 
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company performance (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In family companies, 
principal-agent problems tend to be reduced by several factors. 
 
First, in family firms, families prefer to choose the management employees from 
family members and they also like to act as boards of directors. Consequently, 
families can directly join in the company operations and they can easily acquire most 
internal information about company. The information asymmetry in such situation can 
be alleviate. Even when the CEO is nonfamily member, it still costs less to monitor 
the manager for family corporations than nonfamily corporations. If CEOs are family 
members, there is no principal-agent conflicts in family firms in terms of theory. 
(Aderseen & Reeb 2003) 
 
Second, family managers have the same targets with family firms’ owners. At this 
time, family managers are no longer managers, they are also the owners of family 
company. The interests of managers and owners are aligned. Without certain 
supervision and incentive, family managers still choose to improve firm performance 
rather than seeking on-the-job consumption. Because they know that the on-the-job 
consumption should be paid by themselves. In other words, the separation between 
managers and owners is not dangerous any more in family enterprises. (Aderseen & 
Reeb 2003) 
 
In general, from principal-agent perspective of agency costs, family managers can 
benefit family companies. Even if the family managers are selected from outside by 
family owners, the family owners can also reduce agency costs by enough internal 
information. Therefore, in family firms, principal-agent conflicts are at least less than 
nonfamily firms. Family firms alleviate principal-agent conflicts. 
 
Principal-principal conflicts: the second kind of agency conflicts in family companies. 
The principal-principal conflicts are the conflicts in majority and minority 
stakeholders. Based on current literatures, the principal-principal conflicts are more 
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significant than the traditional principal-agent conflicts in enterprises with centralized 
ownership structure. In such structure, goal inconsistencies in majority and minority 
stakeholders take place of goal inconsistencies in owners and managers. The majority 
shareholders seek their own interests but at the same time they will decrease the 
benefits of minority stakeholders. (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang 2008) 
 
There are two main reasons for principal-principal conflicts: (1) the concentrated 
ownership structure, (2) the formal and informal institutional framework which brings 
weak protection for minority shareholder rights. The precondition of 
principal-principal conflicts is the concentrated ownership structure and formal and 
informal institutional frameworks are catalysts for principal-principal conflicts. 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Jiang 2008) 
 
First, concentrated ownership structures: in most countries, the company ownership 
structures are highly centralized. Even in some countries, the dispersed ownership 
structure is treated as the exception. In East Asia, more than two-thirds enterprises in 
the emerging countries have the concentrated ownership structure. In Europe, many 
countries also have the concentrated ownership structure in most of their companies. 
In Europe and East Asia, the controlling shareholders choose to obtain both tangible 
and intangible benefits through their company controls and of course they would not 
like to share these benefits with other small shareholders. In concentrated ownership 
structure, financial instruments make principal-principal conflicts more serious. 
Because financial instruments like dual-class shares, pyramiding and tunneling can 
decrease the probabilities to seek the company’s best interests. (Sauerwald & Peng 
2012) 
 
Second, the formal and informal institutional framework: principal-principal conflicts 
are easy to emerge when the controlling shareholders’ behaviors are permitted. The 
large shareholders are the principal of the company and they control the internal 
governance mechanisms. Correspondingly, minority shareholders mainly rely on 
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external governance mechanisms. When the external governance mechanisms are 
weak, the interests of minority shareholders are dangerous. In many emerging 
countries, the concentrated ownership structure usually emerges with the weak 
minority shareholders protection. In such condition, the risk of minority shareholders’ 
profits increases. (Sauerwald & Peng 2012) 
 
Because the principal-principal conflicts are caused by aspects: internal and external 
control mechanisms. Consequently, to address principal-principal conflicts, we can 
consider from two aspects: internal governance mechanisms and external control 
mechanisms. 
 
Internal governance mechanisms: to reduce principal-principal conflicts, one critical 
internal governance mechanism is introducing multiple large shareholders. Multiple 
large shareholder structure can effectively prevent controlling shareholders from 
increasing their own profits. Another important internal governance mechanism is low 
divergences in voting and cash-flow rights. That is to say, decreasing incentives of 
controlled shareholders. Controlled shareholders holding 30 percent shares has less 
incentives to damage the minority shareholders’ interests than the controlling 
shareholder holding 15 percent shares. This is because “one will not steal his own 
money”. Better yet, through respecting minority shareholders, the controlling 
shareholders can set a good example which can increase the intangible company value. 
(Sauerwald & Peng 2012) 
 
External control mechanisms: strong external control mechanisms can be established 
by using effective laws and regulations. Once the protection of minority shareholders 
strengthens after introducing these effective laws and regulations, the seeking scale of 
controlling shareholders’ private benefit will diminish. (Sauerwald & Peng 2012) 
 
In family firms, the traditional agency conflicts (principal-agent conflicts) can be 
reduced, but the second agency conflicts (principal-principal conflicts) will more 
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serious than nonfamily firms because of the followed two reasons.  
 
First, the family company is always concentrated ownership structure. The controlling 
shareholders are the families and they would damage the benefits of minority 
shareholders through several ways. Even though, the controlling shareholders are the 
company owners, they still have the possibilities to seek their own interests instead of 
the company growth and the nonfamily shareholders’ benefits. (Ding, Qu & Zhuang 
2011) 
 
Second, in most countries where the family companies play a leading role, the 
external control mechanisms is usually ineffective. The relevant rules and laws which 
can protect minority shareholders are absent. This not only will improve the 
likelihood of expropriating minority shareholders, but also it can support the family 
shareholders to hide the operation information such as lower quality earnings. The 
lack of relevant rules and laws would provide family shareholders convenience to 
seek profits for themselves not for minority stakeholders. (Ding, Qu & Zhuang 2011) 
 
In a conclusion, in family enterprises, the principal-agent agency problems can 
decrease and the principal-principal agency problems can increase due to the especial 
company governances of family corporations. 
 
2.4. Measures of Company Performance  
 
The agency problems we discussed before tell us why the performances of family 
companies are different from nonfamily companies. In this part, we will use company 
performance to exactly examine these differences. 
 
Company performances are results of activities of companies during a certain period of 
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time. Therefore financial statements can be used to obtain company performances. 
“Market value added, market-to-book ratio, EVA, return on capital, return on equity 
and return on assets” are all company performance measures include. (Brealey, Myers 
& Allen 2009: 708-713) 
 
Market value added: dereferences in market capitalizations of companies and initial 
investments from the company shareholders. The market capitalization (market value 
of equity) is multiplying current stock price by shares outstanding. (Brealey, Myers & 
Allen 2009: 708) 
 
Market-to-book ratio: amounts of income added in each dollar that the shareholders 
initially invested. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 708) 
 
(1)     Market-to-book ratio = Pmarket value (equity) / Pbook value (equity) 
 
EVA (economic-value added): to minus total costs which includes costs of 
capitalization from companies’ profits. Shareholders’ equity plus long-run debt makes 
the total capitalization (all long-run capital). (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 708) 
 
(2)   EVA=( net income+ after-tax interest) – (total capitalization* cost of capital ) 
 
EVA is the income by taking the cost of capital off. That is to say, the EVA measures 
how much a company earns. If the initial invest is large, the EVA will also become 
large. When the manager has few assets, he will not choose the high EVA shares. In 
this circumstance, it will be more useful to check the company performance by every 
dollar earning. There are three different rates of income which based on accounting 
information: return on capital (ROC), return of equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA). (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 711) 
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Return on capital (ROC): dividing the total profits consisting of after-tax interest and 
net income by the total investment (total capitalization) contributed by debt and equity 
holders. Subtracting the tax shield is to make sure that the income which we calculate 
is all based on equity-financing. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 711) 
 
(3)   Return on capital = (net income + after-tax interest ) / total capital 
(4)    EVA = ( ROC – capital cost ) * total capital 
 
Return on equity (ROE): is the amount of income for per dollar that the shareholders 
invested. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 712)  
 
(5)                 ROE = net income / equity 
 
We can also replace the equity by average equity which is the average of the equity of 
the beginning of the year and the equity of the end of the year.  
 
(6)                 ROE = net income / average equity 
 
Return on assets (ROA): is the amount of income for per dollar that the debt and equity 
owners invested. Here, the income is divided by the company’s total assets. Total assets 
are different with total capital. Total assets equals to the sum of total capital and the 
current liabilities. We also use the after-tax interest and this adjustment can help us 
ignore the capital structure difference. (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2009: 712) 
 
(7)             ROA = (after-tax interest + net income) / total assets  
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ROC, ROE and ROA are accounting measures to evaluate the company performance. 
And Tobin’s Q, market-to-book ratio and market value added are market measures 
which check company performances. Tobin’s Q is an important measurement in 
previous literature about family company performance. 
 
Tobin’s Q: the percentage of company capital’s market-value to company capital’s 
replacing cost. It reflects ratios of different company value. Replacement costs are 
whole costs to purchase the same company assets. That is to say, if we want to 
establish the company now, how much we should spend. This replacement coat will 
change with the company market value. The values of the company in financial 
markets show company capital’s market value. It includes market values of company 
stocks and market values of debt capital.  
 
(8)  Tobin’s Q = Pmarket value ( company capital) / Preplacement cost ( capital ) 
 
When the Tobin’s Q is larger than one, buying the existing asset products is cheaper 
than establishing new asset products. As a result, the capital demand will decrease. 
When the Tobin’s Q is smaller than one, buying new asset products will be more 
favorable. Consequently, this will increase the needs of investment. 
 
If the Tobin’s Q is high, enterprise's commercial value is higher than the capital’s 
replacing cost, the capital of new plant is lower than the market value of the enterprise. 
In this case, the company can issue less shares and buy more investment products: 
investment spending will increase. If the Tobin’s Q is low, enterprise's commercial 
value is less than the capital’s replacing cost the manufacturer will not buy a new 
investment product. If the company wants to access to capital, it will buy from other 
cheaper enterprise to get the old capital goods: investment spending will be lower. 
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The effect reflects in of monetary policy is: when the money supply rises, the stock 
price rises and Tobin’s Q also rises. Correspondingly, corporate investment expands, 
thus national income also expands. 
 
2.5. Corporate Governance in Family Companies 
 
Different researchers give corporate governance different definitions. Basically, these 
diverse definitions are derived from different perspectives of company agency 
conflicts. 
 
Corporate governance provides the financial suppliers of the company with an 
insurance which can guarantee their investment return. In widely held companies, the 
activities of corporate governance are often used to reduce the traditional agency 
conflicts caused by separating ownership from management. (Shleifer & Vishny 
1997) 
 
Corporate governance supplies companies with methods that they can use to solve 
dispersed owners’ collative action and conflicts in majority large stockholders and 
minority small stockholders. From this perspective, company governance needs to 
supervise and regulate behaviors of large shareholders. Here, the corporate 
governance mainly aims at the second agency problems. However, these supervision 
and regulation mechanisms can bring some more serious management problems, such 
as managerial discretion and authority abuse. (Becht, Bolton & Röell 2002) 
 
When discussing the corporate governance in family firms, the latter definition that 
from the principal-principal conflicts perspective is more precise. Because, the 
traditional agency problems decreases and the second agency problems increases in 
family enterprises. To be more exact in the definition of family firms’ governance, we 
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need add more other elements. Daily corporate operations in family company are like 
a black box. Family company has its own specific influence factors, like family 
relationship, traditions, self-control and altruism. After adding other relevant 
theoretical perspectives into the discussion, the definition of family firms’ governance 
could be systematic and comprehensive. (Wallevik 2009:12) 
 
In this part, I will discuss the corporate governance of family firm from the different 
relationship perspective. In nonfamily firms, there are three role orientations: owners, 
board and managers. Because every person in the company can act as one to three 
different roles, there will be seven role combinations: owners, board, managers, 
owners-board, owners-managers, board-managers, owners-board-managers. However, 
in family firms, besides owners, board and managers, the role orientations also 
include family. As a result, family firms have fifteen more complicated role 
combinations. Most present researchers combine the three basic roles with the family 
factor. The conformity among family influence, owners, board and managers plays the 
key role in the family company governance. Thus, the correlation in board and owners, 
the correlation in board and manager and the correlation in manager and owners will 
change when adding the family institution factor. It is necessary to discuss these 
changes to better interpret the family firms’ governance. 
 
2.5.1. The Connection between Board and Owners in Family Companies 
 
As a given condition, the main functions of boards are governance and supervision 
under normal circumstances. However, in family companies, because the families act 
as board members, the boards become a combination between family and company. 
(Wallevik 2009:37) Mueller (1988) show that the board even plays the part of adjuster 
to resolve family problems and conflicts about the company governance in some 
cases. 
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Selecting board members in family companies 
 
The main reason for creating board of directors is to maximum company value. The 
board of directors can monitor companies’ decisions to reduce irrational decisions. 
However, when selecting board of directors, owners also want to set their own agents 
in the directors’ board to make sure their own interests. This is the main reason that 
family owners tend to choose their own family members as the board of directors. 
Family owners also prefer to choose family members who are board members of 
another company, which they consider as the “safe solution”. This strategic choice is 
based on the environmental considerations in which people need skills and contacts. 
This strategic choice also suggests that the social relationships and networks can 
influence the family company governance. (Wallevik 2009:37) 
 
When many directors from the family companies hold control rights and also act as 
directors in other companies, social relationships and networks of these directors can 
be strengthened. This suggests that this strategic choice can cope with the uncertainty 
of the environment. These strengthened social relationships and networks can 
provides information about enterprises’ communication and coordination. They 
provide family directors’ power and influence with foundation structure. (Wallevik 
2009:37) Burt (1992) argues that one person’s social relationship and competence can 
reflect in the contacts and networks. Most people think that the person with higher 
competence is more attractive, hence, it is easier for this person to create networks 
and contracts. 
 
Board’s Sizes and compositions in family companies  
 
The board directors’ size is different among different corporations and the different 
sizes reflect the different board’s targets. Westhead and Cowling (1996) suggest that 
boards with big scale include more resource base than boards with small scale, 
37 
 
however, the family members have less control rights when the board’s size is big. In 
family companies, the interests of families want exceed the interests of other owners. 
Because of the combination of personal and families’ wealth, it is important to 
preserve wealth in owner-managed companies. The small size of board directors can 
make sure the independence, control and interests of the controlling family. (Wallevik 
2009:38) 
 
Wallevik (2009) show that family enterprises usually have homogenous compositions 
of boards. Evidences show that the inside directors in family companies is more than 
these in nonfamily companies. And the amount of outside directors starts to grow in 
the second generation companies. (Cowling & Westhead 1996) To preserve company 
control and decisions, the owner-manager usually occupy the CEO role in family 
companies. The composition of board is the result of negotiation between the CEO 
and other owners of family company. But the power from the CEO dominants the 
board’s sizes and compositions.  
 
Board’s practices and processes in family companies 
 
Compared with nonfamily companies where the board size and composition are 
comparable, the board practices are similar in family companies. The family 
companies just copy the board practices from nonfamily companies for the reason that 
what work for nonfamily companies should work for family companies. However, the 
board size and composition can influence the practices and processes of board. 
(Wallevik 2009:38) 
 
With a large number of inside board members, family companies have different board 
processes. Some listed family companies have large boards to use it as the resource 
base, some medium family companies have small boards which mainly consists of 
family members and some small family companies even have no board. In family 
companies, there are other factors such as family ties, family conflicts and even the 
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sibling rivalry. (Wallevik 2009:38)To make sure the board processes can work well in 
family companies, the size and composition of the board can overcome these family 
factors. We can add more outside board directors to increase the amount of board 
directors, which can assure board processes. The increase of outside board directors 
can decrease families’ affects, but it can be a shortcoming sometimes. (Zahra & 
Pearce 1989)  
 
2.5.2. The Connection between Board and Managers in Family Companies 
 
Compared with companies owned by investors, the family companies’ owners are 
usually board directors and managers. Consequently, the issues and challenges of 
corporate governance are different. How to accurately use information without bias is 
the first problem. How to consistently use information under specific family factors 
such as family ties and altruism is the second problem. (Wallevik 2009:39) 
 
The board of directors are weak supervisors under some circumstances. Because it is 
hard to sustain objectivity in family companies, the supervision of the board becomes 
more weakly. Less objectivity means more proximity, but both of them have their own 
costs and profits. Although proximity gives more information and more corrective 
actions than objectivity. Lubatkin, Ling and Schulze (2003) point it still may be hard 
to make wise decisions because of the close family relationship. Besides, some 
specific family companies’ features give managers more power to control the board 
than in nonfamily companies. There are four main factors which makes managers 
more powerful in family companies. First, CEO or other top managers have the right 
to select board members. Second, the available time for outside directors to participate 
in the company management is limited. Third, managers control more precise 
messages of family companies. Fourth, independences of external directors are also 
limited. Consequently, the control of managers increases and the supervision of the 
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board decreases, which makes the board more difficult to objectively monitor 
managers. (Wallevik 2009:39) 
 
In short, the board from family companies is considered not so much to be 
governance mechanism as to be top-level stratagem group. Family members can 
supervise their managers more actively by using the exchange information between 
family members and managers. (Mishara, Randøy & Jenssen 2001) 
 
2.5.3. The Connection between Owners and Managers in Family Companies 
 
James (1999) suggest that because families are eager for companies’ control and 
management, family companies shows a different governance mechanism. They can 
use larger inside ownership to improve firm performance. Family features such as 
trust, love and paternalism can establish a good company atmosphere to consolidate 
family as the leader and reduce agency cost. In family companies, owners and 
managers usually have significant effects on firm performance because of their status 
and control rights. When owners can control the management, the corporate 
governance is viewed as good. From this perspective, family owners can replace other 
supervision mechanisms to supervise and monitor their managers. Hence, the family 
ownership can displace the company governance mechanism. (Wallevik 2009:39) 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) show that extended period of family tie and correlation make 
owners supervise or train managers more efficiently. Besides, they also suggest that 
these family features are important in family company governance. To cope with 
increasing competition, companies need to select professional managers who are 
usually from outside. However, the exclusivity of family companies make it difficult 
to accept outside professional managers. This means that the major challenge in 
family companies is selecting and firing managers. The top-level managers in family 
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companies are selected by family ties rather than profession knowledge. 
Correspondingly, the personalized characters tend to act as top-level managers in 
family companies. Most of family managers lack appropriate management knowledge 
and thus it is hard for them to win in the international competition. (Wallevik 
2009:39-40) 
  
Because of long-term investment horizon, family control can increase company value, 
which means that family ownership can make company advantage. And the 
integration of ownership and management can also reduce ethical risks. In family 
firms, family features like trust and love can increase long-term company value and 
outside directors cannot help much. (Mishara, Randøy & Jenssen 2001) Whether the 
family corporation is successful or not is dependent on trust: family members’ mutual 
trust, especially the owner and manager. Family companies would be dangerous if 
they are short of trust. Due to that measuring trust is hard, it is difficult to solve the 
question that whether trust is one key effect for the family company success. 
(Wallevik 2009: 40) 
 
Unlike economic rationality, family affection between owners and managers can 
affect company behavior differently. Besides a common bond, the rational contract 
between family company and the manager (family CEO) also includes family 
emotions in family companies. These family emotions like jealousy among 
generations and sibling rivalry force family companies establish managerial 
entrenchment. In such situations, managers want to hold on their job and they start to 
reduce internal control. Hence, judgments for managers’ decisions are no more exact. 
As a result, when the manager is a family member, replacing or firing the manager is 
difficult in family companies. (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel & Gutierrez 2001)
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3. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
This part is aimed at these four hypothesizes. In order to make more comprehensive 
and accurate hypothesis tests, this paper discusses some previous empirical studies 
which examine these hypothesizes. By analyzing previous empirical studies, we can 
learn their sample selection, variables setting and models building. Therefore, our 
models can become more perfect. 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) choose their sample by selecting companies existing in 
S&P 500 companies on the end of December, 1992. And they preclude public utilities 
and banks and finally they collect 2,713 firm-years from 1992 to 1999. They obtain 
the board structure, top managers and family information by manually collecting. 
They choose Tobin’s Q and two kinds of ROA to examine company performance. 
ROA has two ways to calculate: one uses EBITDA, another one uses net income. 
ROA measures companies’ accounting performances and Tobin’s Q measures 
companies’ market performances. The model for multivariate analysis is 
 
(9) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (Family company) + β2 (control variables) +β3-54 
(Two digit SIC Code) +β93-99 (Year Dummy Variables ) + ε 
 
Table 1. The variables description for Anderson and Reeb’ paper 
Dependent variables: 
 Company performance = Tobin’s Q and ROA 
Independent variables: 
 Family company = dummy variable (family company = 1, when it is family company; 
family company = 0, otherwise ) 
Control variables: 
42 
 
 Officer/directors own(less family) = equity held by officers and directors 
 Unaffiliated blockholders = an entity holding more than five percent shares and having no 
relation with the company besides their shares holdings 
 Outsider directors = stocks controlled in outsider directors  
 CEO pay based on equity = pay based on equity / ( salary +annual bonus + pay based on 
equity) 
 Research &Development /sales = growth opportunities 
 LT debt/total assets = debt in the capital structure 
 Return volatility = firm risk 
 Ln(total assets) = firm size 
 Firm age 
 
In their paper, they mainly examine the correlation in company performance and 
family ownership and nonlinearities between them. They show that the 
founding-family companies perform at least as well as nonfamily companies. The 
founding-family ownership affects Tobin’s Q much more than ROA. When the family 
holdings is around 30 percent, the family company performs best, which indicates the 
nonlinearities. 
 
Cai, Luo and Wan (2012) test that whether family CEOs improve the company 
performance in China. This corresponds to hypothesis 1 that family CEOs could 
improve company benefits in China. They select the whole family enterprises listed on 
the Shenzhen and Shanghai Chinese Stock Exchanges as their sample. They also 
exclude banks and other firms with missing data or listed on another stock exchange 
and finally they collect 913 firm-years from 2004 to 2007. They use both market 
measure and accounting measure to appraise enterprise performance. The model for 
multivariate analysis is 
 
(10) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (Family CEO) + β2 (moderating variables) +β3 
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(control variables) + ε 
 
Table 2. The variables description for Cai, Luo and Wan’ paper 
Dependent variables: 
 Firm performance = ROA and Tobin’s Q (non-circulation share’s market value = circulation 
share’s market value ) 
Independent variables: 
 Family CEO = dummy variable (family CEO = 1, CEO is family member; family CEO=0, 
otherwise zero) 
Moderating variables: 
 Cash-flow rights = ultimate family ownership along the control chain 
 Control divergence = ultimate family control / ultimate family ownership (example in figure 1.) 
 MLSS = dummy variable (MLSS = 1, nonfamily stakeholder holds over 10 percent shares; 
MLSS = 0, otherwise) 
Control variables: 
 Firm size = Ln(total assets)  
 Company leverage = total debt / total assets 
 Growth opportunities = whole capital costs / total assets 
 Company age = since IPO 
 12 industry dummies 
 
Their paper focuses on correlations in family CEO and family company performance. 
Besides, they also test whether these moderating variables can affect family CEOs’ 
influence. In their results, they suggest that a family CEO can significantly improve 
company performance on ROA and Tobin’s Q. Cash-flow rights and MLSS can 
positively and significantly affect ROA and control divergence has negative effects on 
both Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
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Luo, Wan, Cai and Liu (2013) study correlations in multiple large shareholder 
structure (MLSS) and company performance. This corresponds to hypothesis 3 that 
existences of multiple large shareholder structure could improve company performance. 
They select all family companies listed on the China Accounting and Stock Market 
Research database. They also exclude banks and other firms in a state of ST or with 
incomplete data and finally they collect 379 listed family companies and 927 
firm-years from 2004 to 2007. In this paper, they only employ Tobin’s Q to check 
company performance. The model of multivariate analysis is 
 
(11) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (MLS structure-presence) + β2 (moderating 
variables) +β3 (control variables) + ε 
 
Table 3. The variables description for Luo, Wan, Cai and Liu’ paper 
Dependent variables: 
 Firm performance = Tobin’s Q (non-circulation share’s market value = 30% * circulation 
share’s market value) 
Independent variables: 
 MLS structure-presence = dummy variable (MLSS = 1, nonfamily stakeholder holds over 5 
percent shares; MLSS = 0, otherwise) 
Moderating variables: 
 NERI’s marketization index= the level of China’s regional formal institutions 
Control variables: 
 Company size = Ln(total assets)  
 Company leverage = total debt / total assets 
 Sales growth = the change ratio in sales year-on-year 
 Tangible assets = tangible assets / total assets 
 12 industry dummies 
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They use both FGLS and OLS regression analyses to support the presence of MLSS 
could improve family corporations’ performances. In addition, the moderating 
variable can affect this relationship. High level of formal institution makes the 
positive influence increase more quickly than low level of formal institution. 
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4. DATA COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Sample  
 
The sample of this paper are companies listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Board from 2009 to 2013. Unlike companies listed on the main boards such as 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Chinese Stock Exchanges, companies listed on SME Board 
have less pyramid ownership structures and cross shareholdings. And they want to be 
listed mainly because of the main business and the main assets instead of money 
encirclement. Besides, small and medium listed companies have more exact and clear 
internal relationship because of short listed time. Therefore, companies listed on the 
SME Board are suitable for family ownership structure researches and the results will 
be more reliable. 273 corporations are listed on the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Board in 2008 and companies should be continuous listed from 2008 to 2013. 
Consequently, the sample includes 273 listed companies and 1,365 firm-year 
observations.  
 
4.2. Data Collection 
 
The information about family ownership, family CEO and multiple large shareholders 
is hand-collected. From “CNINFO” website (http://www.cninfo.com.cn) created by 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, ten largest shareholders and executives can be obtained. 
Enterprises, where the family or ultimate stockholder is the largest stockholder and 
he/she owns over one-tenth of stocks, are identified as family companies. To make 
sure whether a family is the largest shareholder, searching engines are used to find out 
the relationship between these ten largest shareholders. Similarly, the family CEO can 
be made certain. In these family companies, the second largest shareholder is also 
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checked. If the second largest shareholder holds more than ten percent shares, 
multiple-large-shareholder structure exists. 
 
Other financial data about sample is collected from China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. (http://www.gtarsc.com/) 
 
4.3.  Approach and Model 
4.3.1. Variables 
 
Dependent variable is firm performance. According to previous empirical studies, this 
paper chooses market measure and accounting measures as the dependent variables. 
Therefore, the explained variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA, ROE. 
 
Dependent variables are family firm, family CEO, family ownership and multiple 
large shareholder structure. These four dependent variables are chosen in accordance 
with four hypotheses. Family firm, family CEO and multiple large shareholder 
structure are dummy variables. Family ownership equals to percentages of stocks that 
under the control of families or the ultimate stockholder. 
 
Control variables are company size, company leverage, growth opportunities, 
company age and company risk. The natural logarithm of total assets measures 
company size. Lager companies can perform better than small companies based on 
economy of scale and the finance resource. Hence, firm size can affect company 
performance and it should be included. Firm leverage is calculated by dividing the 
long and short debt by whole assets. Higher company leverage means more debt it 
borrows and therefore the company need to pay more interest to debt investors. 
Increasing interest payment can harm company performance. Therefore, firm leverage 
should be included in the control variables. Growth opportunities is calculated by 
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dividing the research & development costs by all sales. The growth opportunities are 
important for better performance and they should be contained in multivariate 
analysis. Firm age is measured by years since initial public offer. Because older 
companies tend to have better firm governance mechanisms and higher information 
liquidity. Older companies can perform better than younger companies, therefore, 
firm age is also an important control variables. Companies risk is described by 
volatilities of companies’ stock return and it is necessary to be added in the 
regressions. The more stock return volatility, the more risk that the company will have. 
Intangible asset shows the percentage of intangible asset in the whole assets. The 
intangible asset includes branding and popularity and more intangible asset means 
more market value (Gutiérrez & Pombo 2009). Therefore, the relationship between 
intangible asset and total assets is positive. The variable descriptions can be seen from 
table 4. 
 
Table 4. Variables and calculations 
Type  Variable  Symbol  Calculation  
Explained  
variables 
ROA ROA ROA = (after-tax interest + net earnings) / total 
assets 
ROE ROE ROE = net earnings / total shareholders’ equity 
Tobin’s Q TQ TQ = [tradable stocks’ market price* (tradable + 
non tradable stocks)+ total debt] / total assets 
    
Explanatory 
variables 
Family company  FF FF = 1, family firm 
FF = 0, nonfamily firm 
Family CEO FC FC = 1, family CEO 
FC = 0, nonfamily CEO 
Family ownership FO FO = the ratio of shares held by the family or the 
ultimate individual 
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Multiple large 
shareholder 
structure 
MLSS MLSS = 1, multiple large shareholder structure 
presences 
MLSS = 0, no multiple large shareholder 
structure presences  
    
Control 
variables  
Firm size FS FS = Ln(total assets) 
Firm leverage  FL FL = total debt / total assets 
Growth 
opportunities 
GO GO = Research &Development cost / total sales 
Firm age FA FA = years since IPO 
Intangible 
asset  
IA IA = intangible asset / total assets 
Return 
volatility  
FR FR = stock return volatility per year  
 
4.3.2. Models 
 
The main task is to figure out associations between family-ownership and company 
performances. And three other hypotheses can test why family firms perform different 
with nonfamily firms. However, it is without controversy that many other factors 
besides family company can affect company performance. Most factors mentioned in 
the front part may bring greater influence on firm performance. They are regarded as 
control variables. Consequently, they are contained in the multivariate model. 
Multivariate analysis includes both explanatory and control variables. The models are 
as followed: 
 
(12) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (family-company) +β2 (control-variables) + ε 
(13) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (family-CEO) + β3 (control-variables) + ε 
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(14) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (family-ownership) + β3 (control-variables) + ε 
(15) Company Performance = β0 + β1 (MLS structure-presence) + β3 (control-variables) 
+ ε 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Enterprises in our sample can be categorized into fifteen different industries. The 
distribution of family companies and nonfamily companies in different industries can 
be seen from table 5. 
 
Table 5. Family companies’ distribution 
Industries Nonfamily 
companies 
Family 
companies 
companies Percent family 
companies in 
industry 
A Agriculture 3 2 5 40.00% 
B Mining 2 1 3 33.33% 
C Manufacturing 148 67 215 31.16% 
D Utilities 1 1 2 50.00% 
E Construction 8 0 8 0.00% 
F Wholesale & Retail 3 4 7 57.14% 
G Transportation 1 1 2 50.00% 
H Hotels & Catering 1 0 1 0.00% 
I IT 6 7 13 53.85% 
J Finance 1 0 1 0.00% 
K Real Estate 5 2 7 28.57% 
L Business Support 2 1 3 33.33% 
M Research & Development 2 0 2 0.00% 
N Environmental Protection 3 0 3 0.00% 
R Media 1 0 1 0.00% 
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All 187 86 273 31.50% 
 
It can be observed that most companies of the sample belong to manufacturing 
industry. In manufacturing industry, approximately one-third companies are family 
companies, which is similar to the whole sample. There are no family companies 
existing in finance, research & development, environmental protection and media 
industries. In wholesale & retail industry, the ratio of family companies is the largest, 
reaching 57.14 percent. In utilities, wholesale & retail, transportation and IT 
industries, nearly more than half enterprises are family controlled. 
 
Although in this sample, the ratio of family firms is not as large as in other Asian 
countries. The ratio is still more than one-third which is like the proportion of family 
corporations in S&P 500. The proportions of family enterprises in different industries 
are different and the differences are large.  
 
Table 6 describes descriptive statistics for all companies. These descriptive statistics 
includes means, medians, maximums, minimums and standard deviations values for 
the control variables, dependent variables and family ownership in the sample. 
Because time-period is 5 years, family companies can become nonfamily companies 
and nonfamily companies can also become family companies in these 5 years. To 
adjust these changes in enterprise types, the family company is identified when the 
family control this company at least one yare and these means are calculated by 
averaging across years. Then to get the mean for the sample, dividing these results by 
firm numbers.  
 
Table 6. Summary statistics  
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. 
Firm age 4.892  4.920  9.520  1.270  1.895  
Firm leverage 0.425  0.421  1.293  0.018  0.197  
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Firm risk 0.449  0.443  0.743  0.231  0.087  
Firm size 21.350  21.256  26.871  18.594  0.963  
Growth opportunity 0.005  0.000  0.361  0.000  0.023  
Intangible asset 0.047  0.038  0.895  0.000  0.051  
      
ROA 0.048  0.044  0.374  -1.189  0.070  
ROE 0.044  0.081  0.708  -43.966  1.200  
Tobin’s Q 2.906  2.337  15.065  0.883  1.846  
      
Family ownership 
ratio 0.098  0.000  0.735  0.000  0.162  
 
Growth opportunity can be obtained by dividing research & development costs by 
total sales. In table 6, average growth opportunities is only 0.005 and the biggest 
growth opportunity is only 0.361. The average of firm leverage is 0.42465. The 
average firm size is 21.350, the maximum is 26.871 and the minimum is 18.594. That 
is to say, the differences about firm size among these 273 firms are not that big. 
Company age is the age after IPO and average company age is 4.892. Since the SME 
board is created since 2004, the average company age indicates that large amounts of 
enterprises in our sample are created in 2008. Intangible asset equals to dividing 
intangible asset by the total assets. For this intangible asset, the maximum is 0.895 
and the mean is only 0.047.  
 
Tobin’s Q and ROA, ROE are employed to check the company performances. Means 
of ROA, ROE are 0.048, 0.044 respectively and the mean of Tobin’s Q is 2.906 which 
is the biggest. The Std. Dev. of Tobin’s Q is the largest among three performance 
measurements. But the difference between maximum and minimum of ROE is the 
biggest. 
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Table 7. Correlation data 
 FF ROA ROE TQ FC FO MLSS FS FA GO IA FL FR 
FF              
ROA 0.04              
ROE 0.02  0.56             
TQ 0.11  0.41  0.01            
FC 0.71  0.04  0.01  0.06           
FO 0.89  0.04  0.01  0.12  0.66          
MLSS 0.50  0.01  0.00  0.05  0.40  0.30         
FS -0.17  0.02  0.07  -0.44  -0.15  -0.15  -0.06        
FA -0.06  -0.07  0.00  -0.30  -0.09  -0.08  0.00  0.25       
GO 0.02  0.08  0.01  0.18  -0.02  0.03  0.01  -0.07  0.02      
IA 0.01  -0.15  -0.22  0.07  -0.03  -0.01  0.01  -0.19  0.08  0.07     
FL -0.13  -0.44  -0.10  -0.47  -0.12  -0.13  -0.08  0.49  0.08  -0.17  -0.04    
FR 0.05  -0.04  -0.02  0.32  -0.01  0.06  0.00  -0.31  -0.46  0.02  -0.03  -0.05   
 
Table 7 shows correlations among dependent variables, control variables and 
independent variables. Consistent with our main hypothesis, family ownership 
structure have positive correlations with accounting or market company incomes. The 
association between family firm and market measure of company performance is 
much stronger. These three correlations are consistent with the relationships of family 
ownership ratio and company performances. The presence of multiple large 
shareholder structure has no effects on ROE, but it has positive correlations with ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. Company size, company age and company leverage have the negative 
relationship with company performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2. Univariate Analysis 
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Univariate analysis is the easiest statistical analysis. As the name suggests, there is 
only one variable in the univarite analysis. Analyzing problems between family firm 
and firm performance, the most important variable is family firm ownership. In table 
8, the means of different variables are calculated for family corporations and 
nonfamily corporations respectively. In addition, table 8 provides the difference of 
means tests and t-statistic is used here to see if the difference is statistically significant. 
These means tests also use across year averages for each company. 
 
Table 8. Differences tests for the averages 
  Family companies Nonfamily companies t-values 
1 Number of firms 86  187   
2 Family firm 0.310    
3 Family CEO 0.593    
4 MLSS 0.326    
     
5 Firm age 4.712  4.979  2.45** 
6 Firm leverage 0.388  0.442  5.09*** 
7 Firm risk 0.455  0.446  -1.71* 
8 Firm size 21.113  21.460  6.89*** 
9 Growth opportunity 0.006  0.004  -1.02 
10 Intangible asset 0.047  0.047  -0.35 
     
11 ROA 0.052  0.046  -1.45 
12 ROE 0.072  0.031  -0.86 
13 Tobin’s Q 3.206  2.767  -3.84*** 
Notes: *, ** and*** denote coefficient significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively 
 
Rows 2, 3 and 4 show family companies’ characteristics and corresponding means for 
nonfamily companies are zero. In family companies, the average holdings for families 
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is 31 percent, which is close to the best “family holding” according to Anderson and 
Reeb (2003). Nearly 60 percent family companies hire CEOs based on family tie and 
40 percent CEOs in family firms are hired from outside. 32.6 percent of family 
enterprises have the multiple large shareholder structure.  
 
Rows 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 provide information about control variables. The means of 
firm leverage for family companies and nonfamily companies are 0.388 and 0.442 
respectively. The family firm leverage is statistically significantly smaller than 
nonfamily firm. Firm size of nonfamily company is a little bigger than family 
company. And this difference in firm size is statistically significant. Family companies, 
on average, are younger than nonfamily companies. The company age difference is 
small but statistically significant. 
 
Rows 11, 12 and 13 indicate company performance differences between family 
companies and nonfamily companies. As we can see from table 7(employing ROA, 
ROE & Tobin’s Q), family companies have positive correlations with company 
performances. Differences in table 8 indicate the family companies can perform better 
than nonfamily companies according to the Tobin’s Q (market measure). And the 
difference is statistically significant. As adopting accounting performance measure 
(ROA and ROE), the family companies also show better performance than nonfamily 
companies but the difference is statistically insignificant.  
 
5.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Investigating correlations between family controlling and company performances is 
the major goal. The multivariate analysis includes other control variables which can 
make the influence of family ownership more exact. This paper uses panel least 
squares method for the regression analysis. The data periods include 5 years from 
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2009 to 2013 and cross-sections include 273 companies. The total panel observations 
is 1365. To control serial correlation, this paper adopts econometric technique: 
random-effects panel data regressions.  
 
Table 9 shows regressions’ outcomes for the correlation between family firm and 
company performance. Through accounting measures (ROE and ROA), columns 1 
and 2 investigate the company benefits. In column 3, market measure (Tobin’s Q) is 
adopted to show company performances. Dummy variable of family company is the 
independent variable and performance measures (ROA, ROE &Tobin’s Q) are 
dependent variables. Regressions also include 6 control variables and adjusted R 
square. The adjusted R square shows the goodness-of-fit of the multiple regression 
analysis. If the adjusted R square is close to 1, the multiple regression analysis 
appears to have a better fit. And when you use this multiple regression model to 
predict, the results would be more reliable.  
 
Table 9. Family ownership and company performance  
 Accounting measure Market measure 
 1 ROA 2 ROE 3 Tobin's Q 
(1) Intercept -0.292*** 
(-6.20) 
-2.095**  
(-2.26) 
0.460***  
(16.33) 
    
(2) Family firm 0.001 
(0.37) 
0.040  
(0.58) 
0.005 ** 
(2.42) 
    
(3) Firm age -0.004*** 
(-4.17) 
0.003 
(0.14) 
0.003***  
(5.77) 
(4) Firm leverage -0.205*** 
(-21.35) 
-0.930***  
(-4.93) 
-0.934*** 
(162.90) 
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(5) Firm risk -0.027 
(-1.28) 
-0.058  
(-0.14) 
-0.172*** 
(13.52) 
(6) Firm size 0.022*** 
(10.32) 
0.129***  
(3.10) 
0.021***  
(-16.69) 
(7) Growth opportunity 0.054 
(0.77) 
0.282  
(0.20) 
0.088**  
(-2.12) 
(8) Intangible asset -0.143*** 
(-4.41) 
-4.741*** 
(-7.42) 
-0.078***  
(4.04) 
    
(9) Adjusted R square 0.284 0.066 0.961 
Note: t-statistical values are in parentheses.  
*, ** and*** denote coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Like what discussed before, family control can improve company performance. 
Relatively strong evidence can be seen from row 2, which can support family 
companies perform better than nonfamily companies. All the coefficients of family 
firm are positive when employing ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Especially, when 
measuring company income by Tobin’s Q, family companies appear to significantly 
lead more benefits than nonfamily companies. Meanwhile, the adjusted R square is 
0.961, which can show the regression is reliable. Even though, when using ROE as 
the measure of company performance, the performance difference seems to be larger 
than Tobin’s Q. But this difference is statistically insignificant.   
 
Consequently, the family firm has positive influences on firm performance. When 
using Tobin’s Q, the positive influence is significant at 1 percent level. This provides 
support for the main research hypothesis. Therefore, the main hypothesis can be 
accepted. 
 
Since family companies can perform different, reasons for these differences need to 
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be discussed. Corresponding with hypothesis 1, 2 and 3, model 1 to 6 in table 10a and 
model 7 to 9 can explain these reasons. This multivariate analysis also includes other 
six control variables. Regression analysis method in table 10a and table 10b is also 
panel least squares method. The data periods include 5 years from 2009 to 2013 and 
cross-sections include 86 family companies. Because the independent variables in 
table 10a and table 10b show the characteristics of family companies and the 
motivation is to know why family companies perform different, so the sample for 
model 1-9 is 86 family companies listed on SME board from 2009 to 2013. That is to 
say, nonfamily companies in previous sample are eliminated to get the new sample. 
The total panel observations is 430. Random-effects panel data regressions are used to 
control serial correlation. 
 
Table 10a consists of 6 models and two kinds of accounting performance measures. 
Models 1, 2 and 3 use return on asset (ROA) to check the accounting measures of 
company performance. Models 4, 5 and 6 describe how dependent and control 
variables influence return on equity (ROE). In table 10a and table 10b, the results 
explain three relationships. Models 1, 4 and 7 show the relationship between family 
CEOs and family company performance. Models 2, 5 and 8 present the correlation 
between the ratio of family holdings and family company performance. Models 3, 6 
and 9 report how multiple large shareholder structure works in family companies. 
These three relationship are derived from the main characteristics of family company 
and used to test hypothesis 1, 2 and 3.  
 
Previous empirical studies support that family CEOs can benefit family company 
performance. They can bring unique and special skills to the family company which 
can improve both accounting profit and market profit of this family company. 
However, we get opposite results. 
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Table 10a. Regression results on family CEOs, family ownership and multiple large 
shareholder structure（accounting measures） 
 Accounting measure(ROA) Accounting measure(ROE) 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 
(1) intercept -0.239*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.254*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.248*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.830*** 
(-3.24)  
-0.861***  
(-3.38)  
-0.868***  
(-3.46) 
(2)family firm*family 
CEO 
-0.002 
(-0.40) 
  -0.013 
(-0.77)  
 
  
(3)family firm*family 
ownership ratio 
 -0.023 
(-1.19) 
  -0.021 
(-0.34) 
 
 
(4)family firm*multiple 
large shareholder structure 
  -0.006 
(-1.04) 
  -0.027  
(-1.52) 
(5)firm age -0.007*** 
(-4.21) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.29) 
-0.007*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.014***  
(-3.24) 
-0.014***  
(-3.21) 
-0.014***  
(-3.16) 
(6)firm leverage -0.201*** 
(-11.95) 
-0.201*** 
(-12.00) 
-0.202*** 
(-12.00) 
-0.334***  
(-6.65) 
-0.333*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.419***  
(-8.01) 
(7)firm risk -0.052 
(-1.58) 
-0.049 
(-1.49) 
-0.050 
(-1.53) 
-0.029  
(-0.36) 
-0.019  
(-0.23) 
-0.021  
(-0.26) 
(8)firm size 0.020*** 
(5.34) 
0.021*** 
(5.49) 
0.021*** 
(5.47) 
0.053*** 
(4.43)   
0.054*** 
(4.51) 
-0.416*** 
(-3.50) 
(9)growth opportunity 0.271* 
(1.87) 
0.290** 
(2.00) 
0.272* 
(1.88) 
-0.136  
(-0.32 ) 
-0.100  
(-0.24) 
-0.114  
(-0.27) 
(10)intangible asset -0.121 
(-1.61) 
-0.125* 
(-1.65) 
-0.116 
(-1.54) 
-0.072  
(-0.34) 
-0.063  
(-0.30) 
-0.048 
(-0.22)  
(11) Adjusted-R square 0.284 0.347 0.347 0.115  0.113  0.119  
Note: t-statistical values are in parentheses.  
*, ** and*** denote coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 10b. Regression results on family CEOs, family ownership and multiple large 
shareholder structure (market measure) 
 Tobin’s Q 
 7 8 9 
(1) Intercept 12.160*** 
(4.67) 
11.504*** 
(4.49) 
11.526*** 
(4.49) 
    
(2)family firm* family CEO -0.222 
(-1.35) 
  
(3)family firm*family ownership ratio  0.131 
(-1.35) 
 
(4)family firm*multiple large shareholder 
structure 
  0.033 
(0.20) 
(5)firm age -0.145*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.136*** 
(2.74) 
-0.138*** 
(-2.78) 
(6)firm leverage -4.193*** 
(-8.01) 
-4.175*** 
(-7.96) 
-4.172*** 
(-7.94) 
(7)firm risk 5.110*** 
(4.94) 
5.356*** 
(5.25) 
5.363*** 
(5.26) 
(8)firm size -0.416*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.402*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.401*** 
(-3.38) 
(9)growth opportunity 23.619*** 
(5.21) 
24.213*** 
(5.35) 
24.317*** 
(5.38) 
(10)intangible asset -3.955* 
(-1.68) 
-3.633 
(1.54) 
-3.684 
(-1.57) 
(11) Adjusted-R square 0.402 0.399 0.399 
Note: t-statistical values are in parentheses.  
*, ** and*** denote coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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In the results of table 10a and table 10b, row 2 shows the coefficients of family COEs 
are negative which indicates the family CEOs harm family company performances. 
These three coefficients are not statistically significant, so we cannot find support for 
hypothesis 1. Obviously, more family companies should be added to the sample to get 
the significant results. 
 
Family ownership structure and company performance have the nonlinear correlation 
and around 30 percent is the best percent of family holding (Andersen & Reeb 2003). 
Row 3 shows the correlation of family ownership ratio and family company 
performance. When referring to accounting performance measures, the ratio of family 
holdings increases and the family company performance decrease. But the increase in 
the ratio of family holdings may improve the Tobin’s of family company. Because 
these three different coefficients are not statistically significant, hypothesis 2 cannot 
be supported.  
 
Because these three coefficients show two opposite results, the robustness test should 
be adopted. In appendix, table 12 shows alternative regression techniques for the 
regression between family ownership and family company performance. Some signs 
of positive or negative for coefficients change, which means the models in table 10a 
and table 10b has no robustness. More work need to be done in order to improve the 
robustness. Such as selecting more samples, changing some variables and using other 
econometric techniques. 
 
Multiple large shareholder structure is considered to be a good way in decreasing the 
second kind of agency costs. By dispersing the control rights of major shareholders, 
balance mechanism can be created. As mentioned in hypothesis 3, the presence of 
multiple large shareholder structure should increase family company benefits. Row 4 
presents that how the existence of multiple large shareholder structure affects family 
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enterprise performance. When using accounting performance measures, family 
companies with multiple large shareholder structure perform worse. But the market 
value of these family company with multiple large shareholder structure are larger 
than family companies without it. These three different coefficients in row 4 are also 
statistically insignificant, therefore hypothesis 3 cannot be supported. 
 
Rows 7, 9 and 11 show the control variables: growth opportunity, firm risk and 
intangible asset cannot significantly affect accounting measures (ROA and ROE) of 
company performance. Therefore, existences of these variables would make the 
results unreliable. To get significant results, models in table 11 abandon growth 
opportunities, firm risk and intangible asset and finally obtains significant results.  
 
Table 11. Regression results about these relationships after abandoning unnecessary 
control variables 
 ROA ROE Tobin’s Q 
 1 2 3 4 5 6  
1 Intercept -0.314*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.310*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.858*** 
(-4.61)  
-0.832*** 
(-4.43) 
17.076*** 
(7.04)  
17.710*** 
(7.32) 
       
2 family 
firm*family 
CEO 
 -0.001 
(-0.21) 
 -0.01 
(-0.810) 
 -0.443*** 
(-2.63) 
3 family 
firm*multip
le large 
shareholder 
structure 
-0.006 
(-1.13) 
 -0.027**  
(-1.99) 
 -0.005 
(-0.03)  
 
       
4 firm age -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.217*** -0.226*** 
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(-3.80) (-3.85) (-2.82) (-2.94) (-4.46) (-4.68) 
5 firm 
leverage 
-0.218*** 
(-14.09) 
-0.218*** 
(-14.02) 
-0.333*** 
(-8.46)  
-0.330*** 
(-8.36) 
-4.479*** 
(-8.74) 
-4.546*** 
(-8.94) 
6 firm size 0.023*** 
(6.19) 
0.022*** 
(6.12) 
0.053***  
(5.70) 
0.052*** 
(5.53) 
-0.526***  
(-4.35) 
-0.541*** 
(-4.50) 
Note: t-statistical values are in parentheses.  
*, ** and*** denote coefficient significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Because the regression results for the correlation between the ratio of family holdings 
and family company performance are still statistically insignificant, they are not put in 
table 11. After getting rid of these three irrelevant control variables, hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 3 finally can be examined. 
 
Row 2 shows how the family CEOs affect the family company performance. If there 
is family CEOs, both market measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting measures (ROA & 
ROE) of family company will decrease. And the family CEOs can significantly harm 
the Tobin’s Q of family company. Therefore, hypothesis 1 should be rejected. The 
correlation between family CEOs and family company performance is negative.  
 
Row 3 presents how the multiple shareholder structure works in family enterprises. 
The existence of multiple large shareholder structure can significantly decrease family 
companies’ accounting value measured by both ROA and ROE. The presence of 
multiple large shareholder structure can also harm Tobin’s Q, which is opposite to 
table 10. Therefore, hypothesis 3 should be rejected. The multiple large shareholder 
structure could decrease family company performance in SME board.    
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates correlations between family ownership and company 
performances in China by selecting sample from SME board from 2009 to 2013. 
There are 273 companies in the sample and 1365 observations in the data. For 
previous empirical studies, they pay more attention on correlations between family 
ownership structure and enterprise performances in different countries. This thesis 
also examines why family corporations perform different. 
 
The main findings are that family enterprises outperform nonfamily enterprises in 
China. Furthermore, the family ownership can statistically significantly improve 
company market profit (Tobin’s Q). Contrary to most of the previous papers, this 
thesis found no enough evidence can say the family ownership could improve the 
accounting profit (ROA and ROE) of company.   
 
As for the reasons why family corporations perform better than nonfamily 
corporations, this thesis considered three characteristics of family enterprise: family 
CEOs, the ratio of family holdings and multiple large shareholder structure. 
Unfortunately, no evidence can indicate that the ratio of family holdings and family 
company performance have correlation. This paper failed to reject the hypothesis 2 
that more ratio of family holdings could increase family company income.  
 
Other empirical findings in this thesis indicate that family CEOs can harm family 
company performances. Significant evidence is shown in the results that family CEOs 
and Tobin’s of family enterprises have negative correlations. Unlike previous studies 
about multiple large shareholder structure in China, the findings show that multiple 
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large shareholder structure would significantly reduce the return on equity of family 
enterprises. 
 
6.2. Limitations  
 
Since data about family companies should be manually collected, it costs too much 
time. This thesis only choose enterprises listed on SME board as the sample which 
limits the practicability of conclusions. Because listed family companies only account 
for a small part of all family companies. In addition, some variables in this thesis can 
be only obtained from corporate annual reports. Information about family 
relationships between shareholders can be only got by searching engine. As a result, 
the reliability of data can be affected.  
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1. Table 12 
 
Table 12. Regression results using generalized linear model (Quadratic Hill 
Climbing)  
 Accounting measure Market measure 
 ROA ROE Tobin's Q 
Intercept -0.245 -0.775  11.504  
    
Family firm * 
Family ownership ratio 
-0.023 -0.029  0.131  
    
Firm age -0.007 -0.012  -0.136  
Firm leverage -0.201 -0.321  -4.175  
Firm risk -0.049 -0.068  5.356  
Firm size 0.021 0.051  -0.402  
Growth opportunity 0.290 0.086  24.213  
Intangible asset -0.125 -0.009  -3.633  
 
 
